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Basically conflicts arise when different stakeholders 
are not able to come a mutual acceptance point. Pruitt 
and Rubin (1986) defined the conflict in a holistic way, 
“a perceived divergence of interests, or a belief that the 
parties’ current aspirations cannot be achieved 
simultaneously.’’ Most of the conflict scholars are in 
opinion that process is very important to understand the 
roots of conflict and its possible resolution. The entire 
process of this concerned dispute has been analytically 
described using GMCR (Graph Model for Conflict 
Resolution) model. Basically this model is based on 
game theory which is further extended by Fraser and 
Hipel. In this model instead of cardinal utility, decision 
maker’s ordinal preference can be ranked from most 
preferred to least preferred. The model assumes that all 
preferences are transitive. It gives analytical insights to 
understand the problems within which the possible 
strategic interaction among the decision makers (DMs) 
can be systematically analyzed in order to ascertain the 
possible compromise resolutions, or equlibria. 
2. Modeling 
We propose to apply the GMCR to formulate and 
analyze the static structure of a real world conflict. The 
major advantage of this model is its ease with which to 
model the interplay structure among multiple players 
who have their own effective strategies (called “moves”) 
from a particular outcome and who can only order 
possible outcomes in terms of preference. 
The GMCR (Fang et al, 1993) is founded upon a 
mathematical framework utilizing concepts from graph 
theory, set theory and logical reasoning.  It represents a 
conflict as moving from a state to another state (the 
vertices of a graph) via transmissions (the arcs of the 
graph) controlled by the decision makers. 
Mathematically this multi-player conflict game can be 
formulated in the following way: 
Let N= {1, 2, …, n} be the set of players and K= {K1,
K2, …, Ku} be the set of states of the conflict and n-tuple 
{Di} ( i =1, 2…, n) as the set of directed graph that Di=
(K,Vi). The set of arcs Vi means player i’s possible move 
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between states. Let klkm be the arc from the state kl to the 
state km. If l m ik k V , it implies that player i can move 
from the state kl to the state km, unilaterally. The payoff 
function Pi specifies the player i’s preference order for 
states. If Pi(kl)>Pi(km), player i prefers the state kl to the 
state km. The Graph for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) is 
presented by 4 –tuple {N, K, V, P}, where, N={1, 2, …, 
n}, K={1, 2, …, k}, V={V1, V2, …, Vn} and
^ `\ iP P i N .
One advantage of graph model over more traditional 
game theoretical approaches is that it can represent 
irreversible moves. In such cases, a decision maker can 
unilaterally move from state k to state q but not from q to 
k. DM i ’s graph can be represented by i’s reachability 
matrix, Ri, which displays the unilateral moves available 
to DM i from each state. For , ii N R is the u x u matrix 
defined by 
 
1 if DM   can move (in one step)









  (1)  
Where zk q , and by convention iR (k ,k) =0 
In GMCR, players can make a transition of conflicts. 
When a player does not have an incentive to move from 
a particular state, the state is called stable for the player, 
the state is called equilibrium. In this paper two solution 
concepts are employed. 
Nash Stability  
The state K is Nash stable for player i  iff i cannot 
improve its payoff by changing his own strategies. In the 
other words, 
  ^ `iS k   .                           (2) 
Sequential Stability  
The state k is sequentially stable for player i iff for 
every  1 ik S k , there exists  2 1jk S k
with    2i iP k P k! .
3. Background of the Conflict 
In the case of the Ichinose community (Chizu, Tottori, 
Japan) disaster mitigation conflict, the confrontation 
evolved when the local quarry company refused to take 
what seemed to be a possible action for disaster 
mitigation work ordered by the local government. The 
authors have found that the conflict is classified in two 
phases. In the first phase㧔1985㧕, there were only two 
players, i.e., local government and the local company. 
But in January 2002, a large-scale landslide occurred and 
the local community became alert and more active. For 
disaster mitigation work from this time they also started 
to take a part of this game. Thus in the second phase 
(2002) of this conflict, there were three players, i.e., local 
government, local company and local community. We 
elaborate on the above points more in the following. 
It is a very small community having 32 households. 
Due to potential land resources, the local government 
planned to explore rock resources from this area for 
construction of roads and other civil work. Thus, the rock 
quarry became a resource base for local development. 
Around 30 years back one local quarry company 
(Hisamoto Company) entered in this area in support of 
the local government and this contract agreement 
intended to include safety measures from the company 
side. In 2002 after the devastated landslide, the local 
government ordered to the Hisamoto Company to stop 
the rock quarry and also ordered to clear the rocks and 
debris from the site. But the company refused to do so, 
probably because their quarry work had been officially 
registered by the local government and also their work 
continuously monitored by them. After the disaster, the 
local people were not ready to move from their site. So 
they asked the local government to clear the rocks and 
debris from the site and also to operate an early warning 
system (EWS). Since the local company was not ready to 
do, so the local government took a legally assured 
administrative step. The history of the conflict is 
described here in different time periods (Table 1).  
㧙㧙
Table 1 Chronology of the Conflict 
Year Occurrence Action taken 
1985 On March 23, a landslide occurred and the 
debris felt into the river Sendai (43,000 m3). 
Notification by the local government 
• Clearance of the pilled up waste from the river.
• Taking emergency measures. 
1996 Again on 27 September another landslide 
occurred and the debris felt into the river 
Sendai (30,000 m3) and a large crack was 
discovered along the ridge.  
Notification by the local government 
• Clearance of the pilled up waste from the river.
• Order for emergency measures.  
• Notification for suspension of rock quarry 
operation.
On September 24 and 25, due to heavy rainfall 
another landslide occurred at the quarry site 
and the earth felt in to the Sendai river. 
Notification by the local government 
Clearance of the landslide (securing of a pocket) 
and construction of a deposit pond. 
1998
Again on October 25, the earth (50,000 m3)
was pilled up at the quarry site and was 
crumbled due to typhoon (1825 mm ppt) and 
felt into the river Sendai. Six houses in 
Ichinose community were affected very badly. 
National highway no. 53 and part of the tunnel 
was blocked. The JR line and few quarrying 
equipments of the Hisamoto Company were 
also washed away. 
The local government rebuilt the riverbed and the 
company did the clearance of the disposal earth. 
2002 On January 25, a big landslide occurred and 
the Piled up waste was dumped at the waste 
treatment site. The river flow was blocked due 
to landslide (dam formation). 
The local government ordered to the Hisamoto 
company to remove the rocks and debris from the 
site. But Hisamoto Company refused to do this job 
and thus local government ordered to the Hisamoto 
company for reimbursement of expenses incurred 
in the restoration process in accordance with river 
loss. The claimed amount was 1,736,604,804 yen 
and on March 12, the property of the company was 
totally confiscated. 
2004 Owing to the heavy rains caused by typhoon 
no. 21 on 29th to 30th September the Sendai 
river flooded. Further more due to the heavy 
rains, the left side cliff of the mountain 
collapsed and soil and rocks felt into the 
riverbed, which resulted in dam formation. 
Because of this ten houses and the community 
center were completely flooded and the JR 
line was closed by for one and half days and 
mud and rubbish were accumulated on the 
tracks.
Temporary shelters have been arranged by the 
local government and they also established a 
disaster mitigation office at Ichinose community to 
monitor the disaster mitigation work and operate 
the early warning system. 
On June 20, the new governor was elected.  
2005  Monitoring the Early Warning System (EWS) by 
the local government. 
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4. Model of the Conflict 
We divide the whole process of the conflict into two 
phases plus the instantaneous period of change in 
structure that is interpreted to have occurred between the 
end of the first phase and the start of the second phase. 
To model the static structures of both the first and second 
phases, GMCR is used as follows. 
4.1 Two phases of the conflict 
(1) Phase I: Decision makers and their relative 
preferences 
This conflict is modeled by use of GMCR II. In 
March 1985, the start of phase I and the point in time for 
which the modeling and analysis is done. The two 
players have identified in this conflict i.e., the local 
company and the local government. The local 
government consists of the prefecture government and 
the town office. In that time Player’s and their relative 
options and the Status Quo state are listed below (Table 
2). Mathematically there are total 32 (25=32) possible 
states, but after removing all the infeasible states there 
are 14 feasible states in total (Table 3). Some states are 
infeasible because they are mutually exclusive. In Tables 
2 and 3 ,‘Y’ means ‘Yes’ and indicates that the option 
has been taken and ‘N’ means ‘No’, indicates that the 
player has been rejected that option. The local 
company’s ranking states from most preferred to least 
preferred was 
5 1 13 9 3 11 7 6 2 14 10 4 12 8             and
the local government’s preference order 
was 10 8 9 7 14 12 13 11 2 1 6 4 5 3             
The desirability of each state of each player is structured 
in the following way. A positive number means that a 
player prefers that option is taken, and negative number 
is that a player does not prefer that the option is taken. 
Players have the following options. 
Local company’s desirability 
 Local company wants to quarry rock deposit. 
(1) 
 Local company does not want to operate and 
maintain the EWS. (-2) 
 Local government can allow them for rock 
dumping at the site. (3) 
 Local government can operate and maintain 
the EWS. (4) 
 Local company does not want to monitor 
their work by the local government. (-5) 
Local government’s desirability 
 Local company can quarry rock deposit and 
dump at another site. (1) 
 Local company can operate and maintain the 
EWS. (2) 
 Local government can allow the company for 
rock dumping at the site. (3) 
 Local government does not want to operate 
and maintain the EWS. (- 4)  
 Local government wants to monitor the local 
company’s work. (5)  
Here we obtained only one equilibrium, i.,e, state 9 
(both Nash equilibrium and Sequential equilibrium) 
which was also the Status Quo state at that time. Graph 
model helps to describe the actual outcome as 
equilibrium in this game. It seems that though the local 
government suspended local company’s quarry work for 
a while, but again they gave approval to continue the 
rock quarry work. But the company was not ready to 
take the proper measures for disaster mitigation work 
ordered by the local government. Under this condition, 
the agreement was not stable and local government also 
did not force their power to settle down the agreement. 
Thus the delay of the concrete agreement made the status 
quo state stagnant (modeled as a stable state). Neither the 
local company nor the local government had potential 
improvement from the status quo state. But on 
25thJanuary 2002, a large scale landslide occurred and 
this natural disaster accidentally triggered a social shock 
which forced the game to move on to another phase of 
this conflict. We interpret that in this instantaneous 
period some structural change has occurred. 
(2) Phase II 
The second phase of the conflict has started on 25th
January, 2002. At that time, local community became a 
player in this game and thus the different issues and sub 
issues changed the structure of the game. Player and their 
options and the Status Quo state are listed below (Table 
4). The same option representation of a state is presented 
by indicating ‘Y’ and ‘N’, where ‘Y’ indicates yes, the 
option is taken by decision maker and ‘N’ means ‘No’ 
that is the option is not taken. While‘–’ signifies either 
‘Y’or ‘N’. Here the strategy means choice of player’s 
options to invoke. States are defined as the combination 
of player’s strategy. In this conflict, there are total 512 
states (29=512). But many of the states are not feasible 
for actual conflict for different reasons. For example, the 
local community has two options, to stay in the same 
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village with disaster preparedness and shifting the village 
with public facilities. Both are mutually exclusive, so 
they are infeasible options. But, in case of the local 
government, out of four options, two options, i.e., rocks 
and debris clearance from the site and operate and 
maintain the EWS, both of which are mutually exclusive 
for the local company. This may be possible with 
coordination of both players. So, in this case it is 
regarded as a feasible state for both players. After 
removing the infeasible options, a total of 18 states have 
been identified for this conflict (Table 5). Player’s 
ranking of states from most preferred to least preferred 
are as below: 
Local community: 
13 11 12 17 10 5 3 4 15 2 9          
7 8 16 6 14 18 1       
Local company: 
1 10 2 6 12 4 8 11 3
7 13 5 9 17 15 16 14 18
        
         
Local government 
18 1 13 5 9 11 3 7 12 4
8 17 15 16 14 10 2 6
         
        
Table 2 Players and their options, March 1985 
Players and their options Status Quo State 
Local company  
1.Rock quarry and dumping at the site Y 
2.Operate and maintain the EWS N 
Local government 
3.Allowing for rock dumping by local 
company 
Y
4.Operate and maintain the EWS N 
5.Monitoring Y 
Table 3 Feasible states of the conflict in phase I 
     States     
Option 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Local company 
2 N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
3 Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y
4 N N Y Y Y Y N N N N Y Y Y YLocal government 
5 N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Table 4 Players and their options, January, 2002 in phase II 
Players and their options Status Quo State 
Local community 
1.To stay in the same village with disaster preparedness Y 
2 Shifting the village with public facilities N 
Local company 
3.Rocks and debris clearance from the site N 
4.Operate and maintain the EWS N 
5. Appeal to the national government Y 
Local government 
6.Assisting the local community for shifting the village N 
7.Order of rocks and debris clearance from the site Y 
8.Operate and maintain the EWS N 
9. Waiting for the national government’s judgment Y 
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Table 5: Feasible states of the conflict in phase II 
States 
Options
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
1 N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y -Local
community 2 Y N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N -
3 N N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N N N N -
4 N N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y N N N N -
Local
company 
5 N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N Y
6 Y N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N -
7 N Y Y Y Y N N N N Y Y Y Y N Y N Y -
8 N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y -
Local
government 
9 N N N N N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y
Table 6: Option prioritizing 
Local community Local company Local government 
-6 -9 3 IFF 1 
7 -3 4 IFF 1 
8 -4 9 
3 5 6 
4 6 2 
1 2 -1 
-2 -1 7 
9 IF -3,- 4 7 8 
-5 8 -5 
The player’s preferences over the states defined by the 
combination of options can be ranked by using option 
prioritizing (Table 6).The desirability state of each 
player is assumed as follows.
Local community’s desirability 
 Local community intends to stay in the same 
village with disaster preparedness. (1) 
 Local community does not want to shift from 
their place. (-2) 
 Local company should clear the rocks and 
debris from the site. (3) 
 Local company should operate and maintain 
the EWS.(4) 
 Local company should not appeal to the 
national government. (-5) 
 Local government should not assist the local 
community to shift the village. (-6) 
 Local government should clear the rocks and 
debris from the site. (7) 
 Local government can operate and maintain 
the EWS. (8) 
 Local government wants to wait for the 
national government’s judgment (9 IF -3,-4) 
Local company’s desirability 
 Local community does not intend to stay in 
the same village with disaster preparedness. 
(-1) 
 Local community wants to shift from their 
place. (2) 
 Local company does not want to clear the 
rocks and debris from the site. (-3) 
 Local company does not want to operate and 
maintain the EWS. (-4) 
 If local government will appeal to the national 
government’s judgment, then they will file the 
case. (5) 
 Local government can help the local 
community for shifting the village. (6) 
 Local government can clear the rocks and 
debris from the site (7) 
 Local government can operate and maintain 
the EWS (8) 
 Local government should not appeal to the 
national government (-9) 
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Local government’s desirability 
 Local community does not intend to stay in 
the same village with disaster preparedness. 
(-1) 
 Local community can shift their village. (2) 
 Local company can clear the rocks and debris 
from the site. (3 IFF 1) 
 Local company can operate and maintain the 
EWS. (4 IFF 1) 
 Local company should not file the case. (-5) 
 Local government can assist the local 
community to shift their village. (6) 
 Local government can clear the rocks and 
debris from the site. (7) 
 Local government can operate and monitor 
the EWS. (8)
 If the local company does not cooperate, then 
they can wait for national government’s 
judgment. (9) 
5. Stability analysis and solution concepts 
To understand the behavior of each player in this 
conflict situation stability analysis has been conducted. In 
this analysis, the Status Quo state is not to appear as an 
equilibrium state. States 1, 11, 12, 13, 17 and 18 are the 
possible equilibria in this conflict. Among all the 
equilibria states 1, 11, 12 and 13 are the co-operative 
equilibria and states 17 and 18 are the non co-operative 
equilibria. Practically the game has ended up at this stage 
(as of the end of year 2005) as a non-cooperative way (in 
the form of adversary positions taken by both the local 
government and local company). Since the local 
company was reluctant to cooperate with local 
government thus the local government took the legal step 
against the local company. The states 17 and 18 are the 
final outcomes of this conflict (though the local 
government did not start the EWS at this stage). Since 
the local community was not ready to move from their 
location, so equilibrium 1 was found to be not a possible 
solution of this game. The game did not proceed in a 
cooperative way perhaps due to mistrust and miss 
communication among the players. From the figure 3, 
we can trace out the irreversible moves and common 
moves. From the non cooperative equilibria 17 and 18, 
none of the players had potentiality to move a better 
solution. It is assume that neither local company nor 
local government had the appropriate information of the 
other side. Other wise, a new proposal either from local 
company or local government side could bring the 
conflict in state 11, 12 or 13 or this can also change the 
structure of the game. 
6. Conclusions 
As referred to in the above, we can qualitatively 
analyze how the structure of the conflict has changed 
over time. Our interpretation is that the intervening social 
shock caused by the repeated landslides, have triggered 
the contextual shift in the development of the conflict. 
We may also infer that some political climate change 
such as a new governor being elected and coming in 
office could have also contributed to such a quantum 
jump in the structure of the conflict. The conflict has 
been escalated at the second phase of this game and there 
remained no further scope to deescalate the conflict. In 
this conflict, the communication was stopped. The 
community was not much aware about the risk of quarry 
work. Thus, an effective communication platform was 
very much needed. The structure of the conflict can be 
altered by intervention of third party. They can help to 
bring all the parties in a common table to accept the 
responsibility for concessions and thus the whole process 
can be turned towards a resolution. 
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